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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3578
INFO RUEHDX/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4490
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4258
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2792
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0494
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001431

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019

TAGS: [PREL](#) [UNSC](#) [KN](#) [RS](#)

SUBJECT: DPRK: GOR SUPPORTS STRONG SANCTIONS RESOLUTION
THAT DOES NOT FURTHER ISOLATE PYONGYANG

REF: ANDERSON-BEYRLER MAY 30 EMAIL

Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Ambassador Beyrle on May 30 discussed with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Borodavkin in detail the ref points regarding a UNSC resolution on North Korea. Borodavkin agreed fully that, given Pyongyang's capacity for dangerous actions, the Security Council needed to send a strong message that it would not tolerate challenges to its authority. He indicated that Moscow supported a Chapter 7 resolution that would go further than 1718 and hinted at a willingness to use language stronger than those contained in resolutions on Iran. However, he cautioned that the draft resolution should make clear that the authorization of Chapter 7 action would not inevitably mean the invocation of Article 42 on the use of military force to restore international peace and security. "Even a hint of use of military force against an unpredictable actor like the DPRK is undesirable," he stated. We understand that in a phone conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso on the same day, President Medvedev made these similar points.

¶2. (C) Pyongyang's unpredictability appears to be the main reason for the GOR's reservations on certain elements of the draft UNSC resolution. As Borodavkin elaborated, the MFA was concerned that feeding Pyongyang's self-image as "people in a besieged fortress" might motivate the regime to lash out in some new and dangerous fashion. The international community's tough response to the latest North Korean provocation, therefore, must be calibrated so as not to drive Pyongyang further into the corner.

¶3. (SBU) Addressing specifically the proposed sanctions measures, Borodavkin indicated that the GOR supported weapons embargo and certain types of ship inspections, but had concerns about financial measures and was still mulling over the bunkering issue. He stated that the Russian side was ready to look at all alternatives regarding a weapons embargo and was confident that we could come to agreement on good language in this regard. On the ship inspections, he expressed support for port inspections, but reiterated the concern that the use of military force, which would be inevitable on the high seas, could provoke confrontational incidents. According to Borodavkin, GOR reservations about financial sanctions related to the ability of enterprises to seek credits and make bank transfers, which in his view could harm North Korean trade and directly affect ordinary citizens' economic welfare.

¶4. (C) While Borodavkin made it clear that the GOR would be guided by China's views on the way forward ("the Chinese had a somewhat objective view of the situation"), he stressed Moscow's readiness to work closely with the U.S. on an unified approach that will not simply produce a "lowest

common denominator."
BEYRLE